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retreat into his home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion."6 0
JEFFREY R. FULLER
Criminal Law: Evidence of Prior Misconduct: Whitty v. State:
Thomas James Whitty was found guilty of indecent behavior with
a 10-year-old girl.' According to the state's evidence, Whitty ac-
costed a group of playing children and asked a 10-year-old girl to
help him find a rabbit which he said he had lost. To help with the
search the girl accompanied Whitty to a basement, where he took
indecent liberties with the child.
During the trial, Whitty testified that he had, on the day pre-
vious to the day of the alleged crime, not been in the same neigh-
borhood. He also denied ever asking any children to help him find
a rabbit and specifically denied attempting to take indecent liberties
with an 8-year-old girl, a playmate of the girl allegedly assaulted.
The 8-year-old girl, who was called as a rebuttal witness by the
state, testified that Whitty had attempted to take indecent liberties
with her by using a technique similar to that allegedly used the
next evening. The prosecution initially had tried to introduce this
evidence in its principal case, but the trial court admitted it only
after the defendant, with the aid of several witnesses, had attempted
to establish an alibi. Three times the judge alerted the jury that
the testimony of the 8-year-old was not to be considered proof of
guilt but was allowed only for the purpose of identifying the de-
fendant in connection with the crime charged. It seems that the trial
court considered the testimony allowable because the identity of
the alleged attacker was at issue under the alibi defense, not because
it impeached the credibility of the defendant.
GENERAL CHARACTER RULE
The general character rule can only be understood as a species
of a larger rule, the rule on prior and collateral acts. Proof of such
acts may only be admitted if the facts are relevant to the issues of
the case and there is a logical similarity "between the condition
giving rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding
the issue or fact to be proved."12 The general character rule and its
philosophical basis is well stated in Paulson v. State.3
From the time when advancing civilization began to recognize
that the purpose and end of a criminal trial is as much to
discharge the innocent accused as to punish the guilty, it
has been held that evidence against him should be confined
60 Silverman v. United States, supra note 21, at 511.
1 Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967).
2 1 JONES, EVIDENCE §156 (5th ed. 1958).
3 118 Wis. 89, 98, 94 N.W. 771, 774 (1903).
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to the very offense charged, and that neither general bad
character nor commission of other specific disconnected acts
whether criminal or merely meretricious, could be proved
against him. This was predicated on the fundamental prin-
ciple of justice that the bad man no more than the good ought
to be convicted of a crime not committed by him.
This long established rule is accepted in the vast majority of juris-
dictions.4 The evidence is not irrelevant, but there is no logical
similarity between a man's disposition (the condition giving rise
to the fact offered) and a particular alleged criminal act (the circum-
stances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved) and therefore
it can be discerned that general character is a collateral fact which
may not be admitted as evidence that on a particular occasion a man
acted in accordance with his disposition. In other words, an evil
man may have a good and even a glorious cause.5
EXCEPTIONS
The general character rule excluding evidence of prior miscon-
duct has been subjected to a varying number of overlapping excep-
tions in Wisconsin and most other jurisdictions. 6 In Wisconsin,
evidence is admissible which is particularly probative in showing
six "well established" exceptions enumerated in Whitty.7 They are:
1. Elements of the specific crime charged"
2. Intent9
3. Identity 0
4. System of criminal activity"
5. Impeachment of credibility 12
6. Character (when put in issue by the defendant)'13
This list of exceptions (and similar lists) is sometimes considered
to be a rule by itself rather that an enumeration of exceptions to
the character rule.
4 22A C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW §682 (1961); 1 JONES, EVIDENCE §165 (5th ed. 1958);
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §157 (1954); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §232(12th ed. 1955); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§193-194 (3d ed. 1940); UNDERHILL,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §180 (4th ed. 1935).5 JONES, EVIDENCE §165 (5th ed. 1958).622A C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW §§683-689; 1 JONES, EVIDENCE §162 (5th ed. 1958);
MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE §157 (1954); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§233-
244 (12th ed. 1955) ; These exceptions are statutory in a few jurisdictions: LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§15:445, 15:446 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. §25.1050 (1954);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2945.59 (1954).
7 34 Wis.2d 278, 292, 149 N.W.2d 557, 563 (1967).
8 Kluck v. State, 223 Wis. 381, 269 N.W. 683 (1937); State v. Meating, 202
Wis. 47, 231 N.W. 263 (1930).
9 Herde v. State, 236 Wis. 408, 295 N.W. 684 (1941); State v. Lombardi, 8
Wis.2d 421, 99 N.W.2d 829 (1960) ; Wilcox v. State, 250 Wis. 312, 26 N.W.2d
547 (1947).
'0 Bridges v. State, 247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945).
"1 Smith v. State, 195 Wis. 555, 218 N.W. 822 (1928) ; Dietz v. State, 149 Wis.
462, 136 N.W. 166 (1912).
12 WIS. STAT. §885.19 (1965).
23 1 JONES, EVIDENCE §176 (5th ed. 1958); McCoRmiCK, EVIDENCE §158 (1954).
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The development of this list was traced in an article by Julius
Stone.1 4 He called the Wisconsin statement of the rule, and others
like it, the "spurious rule," and called for a return to "the original
rule."15
Under this form of the rule, only evidence relevant merely to
propensity was excluded. Hence admissibility depended upon
the answer to one simple question. Is this evidence in any way
relevant to a fact in issue otherwise than by merely showing
propensity?"6
Stone stated three objections to the Wisconsin rule.' His first ob-
jection was that it adds to the areas of possible disagreement.
Previous to the Whitty case, a Wisconsin judge had to make these
three determinations :"'
1. What are the exceptions?
2. Are any involved in this case?
3. Is the evidence relevant to any such exception?
(As will be seen later, the Whitty case requires a fourth complex
determination.) Stone's second objection was that relevant evidence
which cannot be pigeonholed into the list of exceptions is not admis-
sible. His third and perhaps most cogent objection was that the
list itself becomes so interesting that the judge is in danger of
becoming preoccupied with its use. Stone stated that "the spurious
rule . . . has tempted the courts to dispense altogether with the
test of relevance."1 9 While many cases will be decided quite alike
using either rule, it is clear that the use of the Wisconsin rule may
lead to the exclusion of evidence (because it is not relevant to an
exception) which would not be excluded under the original rule.20
WISCONSIN ADOPTS THE BALANCING TEST
The Whitty case made clear that the Wisconsin court is con-
cerned about the weaknesses of its rule. The court was careful to
point out, for instance, that the exceptions stated in Paulson v. State
"were all based upon relevancy and probative value." 2 1 The court also
pointed out that in State v. Jackson (which pre-dated the Stone article)
the list of exceptions was not used carelessly 22
In what may be considered, perhaps, an attempt to further
14 Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 988 (1938). A companion article is Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of
Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954 (1933).
15 Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 988, 1004 (1938).
16 Ibid.
'171d. at 1005-1007.
IS Id. at 1006.
19 Id. at 1007.
20 Id. at 1008-1022.
21 Whitty v. State. 34 Wis.2d 278, 286, 149 N.W.2d 557, 563 (1967).
22 Id. at 293, 149 N.W.2d at 564.
[Vol. 51
emphasize that a non-mechanical approach must be taken to the
question, the Wisconsin court has adopted Rule 303 of the Model
Code of Evidence.
RULE 303. DIsCRETION OF JUDGE TO EXCLUDE
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
(1) The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if
he finds that its probative value is outweighed by the risk
that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or
(b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of
confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, or
(c) unfairly surprise a party who has not had reasonable
ground to anticipate that such evidence would be offered. 23
It would seem that this rule will be applied by trial judges as
a fourth determination, thereby making even more complex an
already confused process. Futhermore, although the balancing for-
mula given to the trial judges in Rule 303 sounds quite simple, it,
in reality, calls for the very utmost in judicial ability. The following
six terms, despite valiant efforts,24 are very difficult to define:
1. probative value
2. undue prejudice
3. confusing the issues
4. misleading the jury
5. unfairly surprise
6. substantial danger
It could be argued, for instance, that "undue prejudice" includes
"confusing the issues," "misleading the jury," and "unfair surprise,"
as the Wisconsin court apparently holds.25 Similarly, our court
seems to define probative value as relevancy and necessity.2 Despite
the vagueness of the terminology, it is clear that Wisconsin trial
judges are being made aware that serious consideration must be
given to weighing the delicately balanced and conflicting considera-
tions involved in admitting evidence of prior misconduct.27 The
fact that each trial judge has a unique responsibility is highlighted
in the comments to Rule 303.
The application of this Rule should depend so completely
upon the circumstances of the particular case and be so en-
tirely in the discretion of the trial judge that a decision in one
case should not be used as a precedent in another.2 '
23 Ibid.
24 Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-a Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L.
Rzv. 385 (1952).
25 34 Wis.2d 278, 295, 149 N.W.2d 557, 564 (1967).
26 Ibid.
27 See Swietlik and Henrickson, Ride 303: The Keystone of the Code, 1947 Wis.
L. Rzv. 89, 92, where the authors said that the only alternative to Rule 303
would probably be a long, detailed, unwieldy substitute.
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The Wisconsin court apparently did not adopt the comments follow-
ing Rule 303. It would seem that the above paragraph amounts to
much more than a comment and would deal a serious blow to the
artificiality of the list system of determining relevancy.
WHITTY'S DEFENSES
The defense in the Whitty case mustered four objections to the
admission of the 8-year-old girl's testimony.29 The first argument
for a new trial was that the evidence had confused the jury. The
second argument was that the defense was unfairly surprised, and
the third was that the probative value of the prior misconduct
evidence was far outweighed by the danger that the jury would be
prejudiced. All of these arguments may be effective under the newly
adopted rule. The Wisconsin Supreme Court virtually ignored the
first and third arguments, except for a simple statement denying
their validity in this case.
3 0
Since even the most careful instructions, thrice repeated, cannot
clear up the confusion that a jury experiences in cases involving
prior misconduct, the court's decision as to the first argument seems
doubtful. Mr. Chief Justice Warren said recently:
Of course it flouts human nature to suppose that a jury
would not consider a defendant's previous trouble with the
law in deciding whether he has committed the crime currently
charged against him.
3 1
In a situation analogous to that in the Whitty case, State ex rel.
LaFollette v. Raskin, the Wisconsin court recognized that a jury
cannot fairly determine concurrently the issue of guilt and insanity
when the defendant who "was subjected to a compulsory mental
examination can show a disclosure of inculpatory statements, admis-
sions or confessions in response to questions of the examining
doctor. '3 2 Perhaps the confusion in cases involving evidence of
prior misconduct could be eliminated by using the same technique
used to solve the confessions problem: "a sequential order of proof
based on a separation of the issues before the same jury in a con-
tinuous trial.13 3 The court remarked that "the weight of modern
authority calls for a mandatory two-stage trial rule where the trying
of the enhanced punishment issue or other collateral issue will
prejudice the determination of the issue of guilt. 3 4
28 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, 182 (1942).
29 Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 24-33.
3034 Wis.2d 278, 295, 149 N.W.2d 557, 564 (1967).
31 Spencer v. State of Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967).
32 State ex rel LaFollette v. Raskin, 34 Wis.2d 607, 627, 150 N.W.2d 318, 328
(1967).
33 Id. at 626, 150 N.W.2d at 328.
4 Id. at 625, 150 N.W.2d at 327.
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The third argument, the undue prejudice argument, requires
another examination of the facts. When an 8-year-old girl and a
10-year-old girl both testify at a trial, it is logical to assume that
an unusually emotion-laden situation is uncovered to the jury. Even
when one sets aside the possibility that the alleged crimes were
imagined (apparently a frequent occurence35), there is still the
possibility that the 10-year-old's story made a lasting impression on
the 8-year-old. On the other hand, there must be, even under the
most ideal conditions, the admission of some prejudicial informa-
tion.3 6 When divorced from the stage and relegated to mere specula-
tion, one can only hope that the trial judge, the only man in position
to gauge the reaction of the jury to such an emotional scene, has
assessed the situation accurately.
The defense's second argument, the surprise argument, was
based on a recent Minnesota decision.3 7 The Minnesota Supreme
Court has taken a discovery-oriented stand on evidence of prior
misconduct evidence. The new rule in Minnesota requires the state
to furnish the defendant a written statement of the prior offense
it intends to introduce. Before this is done the state must make a
selection from a list of exceptions which is similar to the Wisconsin
list. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, determined to view the problem
as an evidence question, emphatically rejected this method. In doing
so the court said:
While this rule may eliminate the surprise on the part of an
accused, it does little to eliminate any confusion of issues,
misleading of the jury, or undue prejudice .3
What the court said, it seems, is that although the Minnesota court
has made some improvement in the law this new improved state is
still not perfect. The fact remains, however, that there has been
some improvement and it has come through the injection of a
method of civil procedure, which, as will be emphasized later, may
provide some relief in the area of prior misconduct evidence.
The fourth defense argument was that evidence of other mis-
conduct should not have been admitted unless the accused had been
convicted of the previous offense. This argument was recently made
by Mr. Justice Gordon in a concurring opinion in State v. Reynolds.3 9
He stated:
Actual conviction should be required before the prosecu-
tion is permitted to offer proof of previous occurrences. I
3 Gregg, Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in
Prosecutions for Sexual Offenses, 6 ARiz. L. Ray. 212, 223 (1965).
36 Note, 70 YALE L. J. 763, 765 (1961).
37 State v. Spriegl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1966) ; See 51 MINN. L. REV.
331 (1966).
3834 Wis.2d 278, 297, 149 N.W.2d 557, 565 (1967).
39 28 Wis.2d 350, 137 N.W.2d 14 (1965).
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think our basic concept of presumed innocence makes the
adoption of this rule a logical necessity. Innocent persons may
become involved in a suspicious occurence; innocent persons
are even sometimes charged or indicted. 40
This solution, which has the virtue of precisely defining what crim-
inal conduct may be admitted, has not been given an extensive test
anywhere. Judging from the summary manner in which the Wis-
consin Supreme Court handled the question 4 1 it will be futile to
bring up this argument in the forseeable future. It would seem that
the Wisconsin court believes, probably correctly, that there are
definite situations in which evidence of a prior occurence would be
crucial to the case of the prosecution and not so prejudicial to the
defendant to warrant its exclusion.
RELEVANCY
Perhaps the greatest weakness in the present Wisconsin rule
is the determination of relevancy. Relevancy is the tendency of
evidence to establish a material proposition. When using the Wis-
consin process the question becomes whether the evidence tends
to establish a selected exception to the general character rule. Both
the trial court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court said that the
8-year-old's testimony was admissible to establish the identity, one
of the best established exceptions in Wisconsin,42 of the man who
took indecent liberties with the 10-year-old. The evidence does not
have to establish the exception to be admissible; it is the function
of the jury to determine whether that has been accomplished.
Also, under the Wisconsin process one can always question
whether the proper exception was chosen. It could be argued, for
instance, that method of criminal activity and not identity should
have been selected from the list of exceptions. The 8-year-old's testi-
mony tends to establish that very similar methods were used on
two consecutive nights in a specific neighborhood. Method of
criminal activity could be called an identifying characteristic. Evi-
dence tending to establish the method of criminal activity is also
relevant to the identity of the alleged criminal.
It appears that what actually occurred in the Whitty case was
the impeachment of the defendant's credibility. But was such a
drastic measure necessary or even allowable? The Wisconsin statute
allows only "convictions" to be proved to affect the credibility of a
witness. 43 In addition, it is unfortunate, but the evidence may have
40 Id. at 364, 137 N.W2d at 14. Stipulation of convictions may prevent thejury from receiving evidence or hearing comment upon the convictions. State
v. Meyer, 258 Wis. 326, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951).4134 Wis.2d 278, 294, 149 N.W.2d 557, 564 (1967).
42 One commentator recently speculated that prior offenses may be introduced in
Wisconsin only as probative of the defendant's identity. See 50 MARQ. L. REv.
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been admitted simply because this was a prosecution for a sexual
offense, and the tendency is to view all types of sex criminals alike.
The common belief that there is a high rate of recidivism among
sexual offenders 44 may be what has been prodding courts, in Wis-
consin and generally, to quite liberally admit evidence in prior
crimes cases involving sex criminals.45 The rationale seems to be
that if this man statistically is more likely to be a repeater, it is
less prejudicial to introduce prior crimes evidence. This view, it
would seem, is constitutionally repugnant and completely opposed
to the comments to Rule 303 of the Model Code of Evidence which
admonish that the application of the Rule should depend heavily
upon the circumstances of the particular case.46
Using the original rule one would, of course, not have to choose
from a list of exceptions. Ideally, "method of criminal activity"
would be what Stone called a fact in issue and the 8-year-old's
testimony would be admitted because it is relevant to a fact in issue,
subject to the balancing test. It could be said, in other words, that
the list of exceptions and combination of exceptions is infinitely
long. This seems to be an attractive rule until it is mentioned that
facts in issue under the present system of criminal justice in
America, unlike America's better developed pleading-oriented sys-
tem of civil procedure, are very difficult to determine. The list of
exceptions to the character rule is infinite because there is an infinite
number of fact situations involving evidence of prior misconduct.
CONCLUSION
It seems that not even the Wisconsin Supreme Court is satisfied
with the Whitty decision. While it is true that an admirable improve-
ment has been made on the previous Wisconsin law and American
law generally, by adopting Rule 303 and thereby emphasizing the
final delicate balancing process, the court practically admits that
the modified procedure will not work, warning that "Evidence of
prior crimes or occurences should be sparingly used by the prosecu-
tion and only when reasonably necessary. '47 It would seem likely
that this afterthought by the court could lead to endless further
decisions which would try to pinpoint the meaning of "sparingly"
and "reasonably necessary," both dangerously ambiguous terms.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, it seems, should adopt the orig-
inal rule and thereby greatly reduce the importance of precedent in
133, 134 (1966). The inclusion of a list of exceptions in the Whitty case, ac-
companied by many citations, conclusively disproves this view.
43 Wis. Stat. §885.19 (1965).
44 Gregg, supra note 35, at 231.
45 WHARrON, CaxmiNAL EViDENcE §242 (12th ed. 1955); 50 MINN. L. Rv. 331(1966).
4G MODEL CODE, supra note 28.
4734 Wis.2d 287, 297, 149 N.W.2d 557, 565 (1967)'.
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cases involving evidence of prior misconduct and, ideally, should
initiate a system, perhaps through a much increased use of pleadings,
to accurately determine what facts are in issue.48 If the court is not
willing to destroy its elaborate four-step rule, it should at least
emphasize that there are great dangers which require a thoughtful
and unique solution to each case, including, perhaps, a great increase
in the number of exceptions and less reliance on one specific excep-
tion in each case. For instance, in the Whitty case the trial judge
could have used two exceptions, identity and system of criminal
activity. Theoretically, if such greater flexibility was developed, the
present rule could become as accurate as the original rule.
JAMES G. POUROS
48 Carr & Lederman, 34 CAL. B. J. 23 (1959).
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